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Introduction
In retrospect the 1980s may be regarded as a
decade of financial liberalization in many de-
veloping countries, especially in East and
Southeast Asian economies such as Indonesia,
South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and
Taiwan. 1) Though these financial liberalization
processes are still far from complete, some
economies seem to have been successful while
others continue to face a number of obstacles.
The Philippines is without doubt among the
latter.
The Philippines was a typical economy under
Hfinancial repression" in the 1960s and 1970s,
where the financial sector suffered from
excessive regulations and macroeconomic
instability. 2) Then, in the beginning of the
1980s it introduced financial reforms following
* An earlier version of this paper in Japanese will be
published by the Institute of Developing Econo-
mies, Tokyo, as part of its research project on
"Ruiseki Saimu to Zaisei Kinyu (The Debt Prob-
lem and Financial Policies)."
** iii~ ., The Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Kyoto University
1) For more detailed analysis in the cases of Korea
and Taiwan, see Kohsaka [1987].
2) "Financial repression" was originally used in
McKinnon [1973] to depict a typical situation in
developing economies in which the government
distorts the domestic capital market by imposing
too many and too complicated regulations and
taxes on the financial sector and thus hinders its
development.
recommendations made by the IMF /World
Bank joint mission.
The purpose of the present paper is to ana-
lyze the financial development of the Philippines
during the reform of the 1980s and to discuss
the main issues to be resolved. Pascual [1984]
provided a comprehensive overview on the
financial market in the Philippines and the World
Bank [1988] shed light on recent policy prob-
lems in Philippines' commercial banking, while
Cole and Patrick [1986] discussed Asian coun-
tries' experiences of financial development from
a broad comparative perspective. The inter-
action between financial development and
macroeconomic constraints, however, has not
necessarily been paid enough attention nor ar-
ticulated clearly enough in those studies. As
will be shown below it is this interaction which
appears to be most crucial in understanding how
these constraints have prevented financial de-
velopment and discussing how the government
can manage them in the Philippines.
The first half of the 1980s was full of turmoil
in the international economic environment. The
Philippines was one of the developing countries
most seriously affected by this tunnoil, which
had a significant impact on the process of its
financial development. 3) It will be argued here
that what matters in the case of the Philippines
3) At the same time the Phillippines was one of the
most erroneously managed economies during the
period (See Kohsaka [1990]).
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is macroeconomic rather than microeconomic.
In particular, the "debt problem," both domes-
tic and external, has much to do with its pros-
pect of financial development.
This paper consists of 5 sections. Section 1
presents a general conceptual framework within
which to analyze financial development in the
Philippines. The degree of financial intermedia-
tion is given a key role. In this respect, com-
parison with other Asian economies would help
highlight the case of the Philippines. With Sec-
tion 2 briefly summarizing its financial history,
Section 3 analyzes changes in the macroeco-
nomic balance and the characteristics of the
sectoral financial transactions. It is pointed out
that the financing behavior of the public sector
is crucial to understand the role of the financial
sector. Section 4 examines the interrelationship
between macroeconomic policies and the capital
market. Monetary policy is emphasized as
being closely linked to other macroeconomic
policies such as fiscal management and ex-
change rate policy in the context of the Philip-
pines. Finally, Section 5 summarized the issues
and the prospects for financial development in
the Philippines.
I Comparative Financial Development
The role of the financial sector is not only to
provide means of payments. It is to accept
savings of the surplus sector in the form of such
financial assets as bank deposits and to channel
them to the deficit sector for investment. In
the process of economic development, such
financial intermediation would constitute the
central role of the financial sector. Generally,
financial intermediaries are supposed to be able
to make use of an economy of scale in collecting
information on creditworthiness of the deficit
sector, examining the profitability of their in-
vestment opportunities, and reducing the risk of
such investment by diversification. Accord-
ingly, if the saving of the surplus sector is
concentrated in financial intermediaries and
efficiently allocated to investment opportunities
with higher rates of return, this would enhance
the overall efficiency of investment and lead to
accelerated growth of an economy. 4)
From this point of view, the ratio of money
supply to economic activity level, i.e., the de-
gree of financial intermediation gives a good
measure of financial development. Since money
supply is the liabilities of the monetary system,
the ratio represents the relative size of financial
savings which can be transferred to the deficit
sector through financial intermediaries out of
the savings of the surplus sector. The transfer
to the deficit sector takes the form of either
loans or security investment by the interme-
diaries.
The relative size of financial intermediation in
the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia during
1970-88 is presented for comparison in Fig. 1
using the ratio of broad money to nominal GDP
as a measure. Thailand has attained a signif-
icant degree of financial intermediation since the
4) A reasonable means alternative to transfer funds
from the surplus to the deficit sector may seem
to be "direct finance," by which the surplus
sector obtains such primary securities as corpo-
rate stocks and debentures issued by the deficit
sector. This, however, would never be a feasi-
ble choice for developing countries, because
open markets for such primary securities are
generally underdeveloped in developing coun-
tries. This is due to the low level of income, the
resulting small scale of domestic savings and
investment, and the lack of a network system of
accounting information.
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early 198Os. Indonesia also has realized a cer-
tain degree of financial intennediation if we take
account of its initial low level, and its pace
surpasses that of the Philippines. By contrast
the ratio of the Philippines has shown no signif-
icant upward trend, but remained at the same
level of around 20% for the last 20 years, which
implies almost complete stagnation in tenns of
financial intennediation.
There are two main reasons why the financial
intennediaries in the Philippines remained stag-
nant. First, financial regulations such as reg-
ulated interest rates and reserve requirements
repressed financial intennediation. Second, but
not less importantly, the Philippines lacked
macroeconomic stability, particularly inflation
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control. Before examining these issues let us
briefly outline the country's financial history.
II Financial Market in Review
(1) Early Development of the Financial Market
The Philippines' financial market consists of
the (short-term) money market, the (long-term)
capital market and the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Although the money market was said to be
the most developed in the Southeast Asia, the
capital market was underdeveloped for bank
loans, corporate debentures and stocks [Pas-
cual 1984].
The money market consists of the interbank
call market, the bills market and the govern-
ment securities market. Transaction figures in
these markets are shown in Table 1. The call
market, officially established in 1963, has medi-
ated demand and supply of short term funds
among banks and nonbank financial institutions.
The bills market started in 1965 as an in-
temnn market with newly-established invest-
ment companies as intermediaries for transac-
tions of promissory notes, bills with repurchase
agreements and deposit substitutes outside the




Volume of Transactions 190.4 303.7 505.8
(% of GNP) (124.1) (114.8) (84.6)
Call money 17.8 50.5 226.4
Promissory notes 119.5 144.5 156.8
Repurchase agreements 41.0 95.7 27.6
Commercial papers 10.3 10.5 20.2
Government securities 1.5 0.7 74.8
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, Statis-
tical Bulletin, 1986.
interest rate regulations. With participation by
banks from the late 1960s, the market made
steady growth in the 1970s despite temporary
stagnation due to regulations imposed on de-
posit substitutes in 1976-77. The financial cri-
sis in the beginning of the 1980s due to a
notorious financial scandal, however, seriously
affected the market, which became dwarfed.
This was reinforced by regulations imposing a
lower ceiling and a higher minimum amount with
respect to note issuance in order to prevent the
repetition of such scandals.
The government securities market was
officially established in 1966 but long remained
underdeveloped, partly due to its regulated low
interest rates. This market took off virtually
after the financial crisis in 1981. Aiming at
developing relatively riskless assets in the
money market and then controlling interest
rates with the open market operation, the au-
thorities decided to issue more government bills
through financial institutions newly designated
as government securities dealers. The more
serious the economic crisis became in the
1980s, the more government securities, espe-
cially TBs, were issued at the market-
determined interest rate to finance the increas-
ing fiscal deficit. This brought about a major
structural change in the money market which
will be discussed later.
(2) Financial Reforms
Under the financial reform of 1972, the
monetary system was rearranged and unified
with the revision of the Bank Law and the
Central Bank Law. The main objective was to
expand the scale of financial institutions and
strengthen the control of the central bank over
domestic credits. Developments in the 1970s,
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particularly the development of the money mar-
ket over commercial banking, urged the author-
ities to overhaul the entire system of financial
regulations.
On the recommendation of the IMF /World
Bank joint mission a further financial reform was
implemented in 1980. This had three purposes,
namely, to strengthen the savings mobilization
to financial intermediaries, to devise provision
of medium- and long-term industrial funds, and
to enhance the productivity of the financial sec-
tor by expanding its scale. For these purposes
a number of measures were implemented such
as liberalizing interest rates, permitting
selected financial institutions to operate univer-
sal banking, reducing reserve requirements,
and revising the tax system on interest income.
As a consequence of the reform and with the
help of the chaos in the rival money market in
those days, the bank sector exhibited relatively
steady growth until 1983. The general eco-
nomic crisis during 1983-86, however, drove
several banks to bankruptcy. The two major
government financial institutions, the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), were forced to
seek rescue by the central bank from their
burden of huge non-performed assets. Thus
the recovery of the financial sector had to be
postponed until 1987.
(3) Present Situation
Table 2 shows total assets in the financial
sector excluding the central bank. The sector is
divided into banks, which provide means of
payments or demand deposits, and nonbank
financial intermediaries. The former are further
disaggregated according to their specialization
into commercial banks, thrift banks, rural banks
and government specialized banks. Nonbank
financial intermediaries consist mainly of invest-
ment companies in the private sector and of
public insurances in the public sector. Note that
the share of banks, particularly that of commer-
cial banks, was dominant and that the share of
each category remained mostly unchanged ex-
cept for the dwindling share of government
specialized banks.
During 1983-87, the financial sector shrank
remarkably in not only real but also nominal
terms. Table 2 shows that the financial sector
reduced relative to the real economic activity.
One reason for this was undoubtedly the politi-
cal-economic turmoil during the period. During
the period 1980-86, the total assets of the
banking system decreased by 44% and its pri-
vate sector loans declined by as much as 63%,
both in real terms. For the same period 147
local banks and 32 savings institutions went into
bankruptcy, whose assets amounted to 14 bil-
lion pesos or 2% of the total assets of the
sector. Furthermore, two government financial
institutions, PNB, the largest commercial bank,
and DBP, the largest development finance in-
stitution, went on the brink of bankruptcy so
that they had to be rescued by tranferring their
nonperformed assets to the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) in 1986. These nonperformed
assets amounted to 67% and 84% of their total
assets respectively [World Bank 1988]. The
reduced share of government specialized banks
in Table 2 reflects this. At the end of 1989,
there were 29 commercial banks including 4
foreign banks and 1 government bank (PNB).
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Table 2 Assets of Financial Intennediaries, Philippines, 1980-88
(billion pesos, %)
1980 1985 1988
Assets (Share) Assets (Share) Assets (Share)
(Banks) 188.8 (76.2) 395.2 (78.6) 391.8 (74.0)
Commercial banks 138.4 (55.9) 283.3 (56.4) 328.9 (62.1)
Thrift banks 10.6 (4.3) 15.1 (3.0) 24.9 (4.7)
Agricultural banks 5.6 (2.3) 8.8 (1.8) 10.7 (2.0)
Government banks 34.2 (13.8) 88.0 (17.5) 27.3 (5.2)
(Nonbank financial) 58.9 (23.8) 107.3 (21.4) 137.7 (26.0)
Total 247.7 (100.0) 502.5 (100.0) 529.5 (100.0)
(% of GNP) (93.6) (84.1) (64.2)
Central bank 65.4 251.6
Note: Thrift banks = savings banks+private development banks+stock savings and loan asso-
ciations.
Government banks = specialized government banks = Development Bank of the Philip-
pines+Land Bank of the Philippines+Philippine Amanah Bank.
Nonbank finance=investment houses, financing companies, investment companies,
security dealers, security brokers, pawn shops, fund managers, lending investors,
nonstock savings and loan associations, mutual building and loan associations, private
insurance companies, government nonbank financial institutions (Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS), etc.), and venture capital
corporations.
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines.
III Financing Macroeconomy
(1) Sectoral Investment-5avings Balances
Fig. 2 shows investment, savings, current
accounts of the balance of payments and the
real GNP growth of the Philippines during the
period 1965-89. As is clear from the Figure,
the Philippines expanded investment and
adopted an ambitious industrialization strategy
after the first oil shock in the 1970s. 5) While
the domestic saving ratio increased to some
5) Note, however, that public investment by both
the central government and public enterprises
were the dominant source of an increase in
domestic investment during the period. This is
one example of "erroneous management" (See
footnote 2).
extent from that in the 1960s, there was no
choice but to resort to foreign savings in order
to sustain this high investment and growth.
The deteriorating international economic en-
vironment since the second oil shock in 1979
brought about an overall decline of nonoil de-
veloping economies, to which the Philippines
was no exception. Although the saving ratio fell
as expected, the Philippine government left
domestic credit expansion to continue and stuck
to their expansionary investment policy during
the same period. The result is well known.
The government was forced into default in ex-
temal debt service in 1983, with both current
account and fiscal deficits growing at an
accelerating rate, as well as enonnous capital
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flight due to the political and economic chaos of
the time.
The sectoral I-S balance since the crisis
(Table 3) indicates that the private savings
maintained a level of 17-18% of GNP during
1983-86 despite continued economic depress-
ion. Accordingly, the acute drop in private
investment due to the economic crisis and the
following tightening policy led to a significant
degree of excess savings in the I-S balance of
the private sector. On the other hand, the
savings of the public sector as a whole remained
negative between - 2% and -4% of GNP,
Naturally, in spite of restraint in public invest-
ment, the I-S balance in the public sector
resulted in excess investment, which over-
whelmed the private sector's excess savings,
thereby continuing the current account deficit
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Table 3 Sectoral I-S Balance, Philippines, 1983-88
(% of GNP)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Private Sector
1. Savings (S) 19.9 18.8 17.2 18.2 12.6 16.6
2. Investment (1) 19.0 14.6 11.4 9.8 11.8 14.8
S-I 0.9 4.2 5.8 8.4 0.8 1.8
Public Sector
1. Savings -2.8 -3.7 -2.2 -2.5 1.5 0.6
2. Investment 6.2 4.5 3.7 3.1 3.6 3.4
S-I -9.0 -8.2 -5.9 -5.4 -2.1 -2.8
(Central Government)
Savings 0.5 -0.8 -0.3 -3.2 1.1 -0.0
Investment 2.5 1.1 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.0
S-I -2.0 -1.9 -1.9 -5.1 -0.9 -2.0
(Public Enterprises)
Savings -0.9 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.7 1.4
Investment 3.3 3.0 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.2
S-I -4.2 -2.1 -1.3 -1.1 -0.7 0.2
Current Account -8.1 -4.0 -0.1 3.0 -1.3 -1.0
Source: National Economic and Development Agency.
until 1985. This situation implies that the public
sector dominated the demand for funds in the
financial market during the period.
In 1987, the savings of the central govern-
ment turned positive mainly due to increased
tax revenue that accompanied overall economic
recovery, and the fiscal balance in public enter-
prises improved because of structural adjust-
ments, which brought with it a slight decrease
in the excess investment in the public sector as
a whole. By contrast, however, a recovery in
investment and a fall in savings took place
simultaneously in the private sector, which
caused abrupt shrinkage of its excess savings.
Consequently, since the recovery of economic
growth in the latter half of the 19808, both the
private and public sectors have competed for
funds in the market. In particular, the 1-5 gap
of the public sector has been large enough at
3% of GNP for its financing behavior to have a
great impact on the domestic financial market.
We will examine this more in detail below.
(2) Flow-oj-Funds Structure within the Public
Sector
The public sector in the Philippines is divided
into five subsectors: the central government,
local governments, nonfinancial public enter-
prises (simply, 'public enterprises' below), pub-
lic financial institutions, and the social security
system. Table 4 illustrates the flow-of-funds
structure among these subsectors, excluding
financial institutions, in 1986, which represents
a typical structure in the latter half of the
1980s.
The Table makes clear the transactions
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Table" Flow of Funds within the Public Sector, Philippines, 1986
(billion pesos)
Central Public Local Social
Gov't Enterprise Gov't Security
a. Revenue 79.2 38.7 8.9 13.8
b. Current expenditure 65.7 38.4 7.4 4.9
c. Capital expenditure 11.7 5.9 1.2
d. Capital transfer (net) 1.2 1.2
e. Net lending 31.9 8.9
to public enterprises 10.5
government banks 20.4
central government 5.6
f. Savings (=a-b) 13.5 0.3 1.5 8.9
g. S-I gap (=f-c) 1.8 -5.6 0.3 8.9
h. Finance gap (=g-d-e) -31.3 -6.8 0.3 0.0
i. Net external borrowing (=j-k) 3.6 -5.3
j. Gross borrowing 9.8 18.1
k. Amortization 6.2 23.3
l. Net domestic borrowing (=m-n) 27.7 12.0
from central government 8.9
commercial banks 0.9
m. Gross borrowing 35.5
(TB issuance) 24.6
n. Amortization and others 7.8
Source: Calculated from Central Bank of the Philippines' data.
among public subsectors as follows. In 1986,
the central government saved 13.5 billion pesos
out of a revenue of 79.2 billion pesos and spent
11.7 billion pesos on capital expenditure, 1. 2
billion pesos on capital transfers to local govern-
ments and 31.9 billion pesos on net lending in
the fonn of loans and security investments to
public enterprises and public financial institu-
tions. The resulting shortage of funds
amounted to 31.3 billion pesos, which was
financed by both external borrowing (3.6 billion
pesos net) and domestic borrowing (27.7 billion
pesos). lbis domestic borrowing was made
mainly through bond issuance including Trea-
sury Bills (TB).
In turn, the revenue, savings and investment
of public enterprises were 38.7, 0.3 and 5.9
billion pesos respectively. The gap of 6.8 billion
pesos was financed with 12 billion pesos of
domestic borrowing mainly from the central
government, of which the balance, i. e., 5.3
billion pesos, was used for repayment of exter-
nal debt. The social security system or public
insurances had a revenue of 13.8 billion pesos,
which exceeded that of the local governments,
spent 4.9 billion pesos on current expenditure
and invested the remaining 8.9 billion pesos
mostly in government securities.
What we can learn from the above is this.
Although the main subsectors in the public sec-
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Table 5 Financing of the Central Government, Philippines, 1983-89
(billion pesos)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Finance gap 7.4 10.1 11.1 31.3 16.7 20.3 15.3
(% of GNP) (1.9) (1.9) (1.8) (5.0) (2.4) (2.5) (1.6)
External borrowing (net) 5.4 2.0 -0.3 3.6 6.8 2.1 -1.1
Borrowing (gross) 7.7 5.1 3.7 9.8 15.4 15.1 17.8
Repayments 2.2 3.1 4.0 6.2 8.6 13.0 18.8
Domestic borrowing (net) 2.3 8.1 11.5 27.7 9.9 18.3 16.4
Borrowing (gross) 8.1 35.9 15.8 35.5 58.6 47.3 47.4
(TB issuance) (1.4) (32.0) (11.8) (24.6) (51.6) (35.3) 33.8)
Repayments 3.5 19.6 2.5 4.4 25.4 10.3 17.2
Source: Ministry of Finance.
Table 6 Issuers and Owners of Government Securities, Philippines, 1980-86
(billion pesos)
1980 1983 1984 1985 1986
By issuers:
Central government 18.3 35.7 49.7 61.8 91.4
(Treasury Bills) (3.0) (6.1) (19.4) (31.2) (55.4)
Public enterprises 4.3 9.6 10.7 10.1 11.2
Govenunent banks 11.7 5.5 11.7 25.4 23.7
Total outstanding 34.3 50.8 75.1 97.3 126.3
By owners:
Central bank 6.1 7.8 13.2 12.2 11.9
Deposit money banks 13.0 18.3 24.1 21.1 22.5
Nonbank finance 4.3 5.7 6.6 7.3 12.6
Social securities 7.0 13.6 12.0 14.0 12.6
Nonfinancial private 3.6 4.8 15.0 41.6 43.3
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, Statistical Bulletin, 1986.
tor which are net borrowers or in short of funds
are the central government and public enter-
prises, it is only the central government which
appears as a net borrower in the domestic
financial market. Namely, the deficit in public
enterprises was financed indirectly through the
central government in the domestic market,
while historically it was financed with external
borrowing to a great extent. 6) To evaluate the
impact of the public sector deficit on the domes-
tic financial market, therefore, it would suffice
6) Until the first half of the 1980s the main source
of external finance by public enterprises was
external borrowing as well as borrowing from the
central bank. Direct borrowing from the domes-
tic market was not conunon. See, for instance,
Manasan [1988].
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to watch the financing behavior of the central
government.
The composition of the central government's
means of financing is shown in Table 5. The
financing gap amounted to 2-5% of GNP, most
of which had been financed by domestic borrow-
ing (see the net borrowing figures), particularly
by the issuance of TBs since 1983, when exter-
nal borrowing became difficult. Table 6 depicts
the composition of ownership of government
securities by sectors. The shares of financial
intermediaries and the nonfinancial private sec-
tor have been increasing rapidly, which could




Monetary policy instruments in the Philip-
pines consist of open market operation, reserve
requirements and rediscounts. Since the finan-
cial reform of 1980, the basic policy stance has
changed from selective controls to quantitative
controls. Accordingly, the rediscount policy is
used not as a means of credit rationing for
industrial finance but as a tool for money supply
control or interest rate management. Open
market operation is the most important policy
instrument of the three. It is the accumulation
of government bond stocks due to fiscal deficits
that enables open market operation to be a
powerful and flexible policy instrument.
The annual rate of inflation of 50% in 1984
was obviously attributed to the loose monetary
policy in the previous years. In fact, domestic
credits had been maintained as high as 25% of
annual growth and had risen further to 30% in
1983. In 1985-86, conversely, a very strict
tightening policy was adopted, which was partly
along the lines of the "IMF conditionality." This
reduced inflation severely, as expected, with
the help of reduced aggregate demand, which
was brought about by the negative economic
growth (See Table 7).
With the decline of inflation, nominal interest
rates fell after 1985, though real interest rates
rose actually. For instance, if we take the 90
days TB rate as a representative market rate, it
fell from the peak of 41% in 1984 to 11% in
1987, while the real rate adjusted for actual
inflation rates rose from -10% to +8% in the
Table 7 Major Financial Indicators, Philippines, 1984-88
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
(billion pesos)
M3 121.2 132.9 149.3 167.3 184.8
(% change) (7.3) (9.7) (12.3) (9.8) (10.5)
Domestic credits 166.1 156.7 122.5 108.4 122.0
(% change) (-2.8) (-5.7) (-21.8) (-11.5) (12.5)
(%)
Inflation 50.3 23.1 0.8 3.8 8.8
Interest rate 40.9 26.2 16.3 11.4 15.7
GNP growth -7.1 -4.1 2.0 5.9 6.7
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
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same period.
From 1984, the bulk of TBs were issued as a
means to finance fiscal deficits. As a conse-
quence, particularly since 1987 when the de-
mand for funds recovered in the private sector,
the "crowding-out" has become serious in the
loanable fund market. This is one reason why
nominal interest rates increased in 1988,
another reason being higher inflation. Since
TBs are close substitutes for time deposits in
banks, the purchase of TBs both by the surplus
sector and by financial intermediaries would
diminish the availability of funds in the bank loan
market, with financial intermediation by com-
mercial banks declining inevitably.
As such there appears to be a trade-off be-
tween fiscal policy and financial development
against a single monetary policy instrument.
Note, however, that this is far from the end of
the story about constraints on macroeconomic
policies.
(2) Linkage among Fiscal, Monetary and Ex-
change Rate Policies
Changes in interest rates, inflation rates and
foreign exchanges rates are shown in Table 8.
Interest rates on deposits and loans were fully
deregulated during 1980-83. As a result, ex-
cept for 1984-85, the real interest rate ad-
justed for inflation became positive. Comparing
this with the pervasive negative real interest
rates in the 1970s, it could be said that price
distortion in the financial market was corrected
to a great extent. This, of course, tends to
promote mobilization of financial savings.
Moreover, since financial deregulation, in-
terest rate arbitrage through speculative capital
movements has tended to produce close move-
ments among interest rates. This is especially
explicit since 1986, when inflation and exchange
rates have been comparatively stabilized.
In the present situation the TB rate is the
most basic interest rate in the monetary sys-
tem. Commercial banks have to offer interest
rates on deposits competitive with those of TBs
in order to mobilize savings. In this sense the
TB rate plays the role of a link between the
bank and the nonbank sectors.
On the other hand, the TB rate is affected by
external factors. Foreign exchange controls
have been deregulated since 1983 so that banks
are not restricted in their foreign exchange
holdings. With this enhanced capital mobility,
domestic interest rates cannot be insulated
from developments in external financial situa-
tions. In fact, while the differential between
Table 8 Interest Rates, Inflation and Exchange Rates, Philippines, 1980-88
(%)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Lending rates 14.0 15.3 18.1 19.2 28.2 28.6 17.5 13.2 15.9
Deposit rates 12.3 13.7 13.7 13.6 21.2 18.9 11.3 8.2 11.3
Inflation 18.2 13.1 10.2 10.0 50.3 23.1 0.8 3.8 8.8
TB rate 12.1 12.5 13.8 14.2 28.5 26.7 16.1 11.5 14.7
LmOR 14.2 16.9 13.3 9.7 10.9 8.4 6.9 7.2 8.0
Devaluation 1.8 5.2 8.1 30.1 50.3 22.1 9.6 0.9 2.6
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines and IMF, International Financial StatistU:s, various issues.
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Table 9 Real Effective Exchange Rates, Philip-
pines, 1985-88
It is generally hard to define an "appropriate"
level of exchange rates. Real devaluation will
improve international competitiveness, but de-
value real income, thereby deteriorating na-
tional welfare. Furthermore, when a country
carries over external debt, nominal devaluation
will increase the debt service burden because of
the increased domestic-currency value of debt.
domestic and foreign short-term interest rates
widened in 1984-86 when devaluation was
widely expected, it dwindled again to 4-6%
after a pair of large devaluations and under
relatively stable prices.
In general, monetary policy is closely associ-
ated with exchange rate policy via the interest
rate arbitrage between domestic and foreign
assets. The monetary tightening during 1987-
88 was not only to control inflation, but also to
stabilize the exchange rate by preventing capital
outflow with higher domestic interest rates.
With the nominal exchange rate pegged to the
U.S. dollar, devaluation has been maintained
relatively small since the two "maxi-
devaluations" during 1983-84. Though the
peso depreciated against trade partners' curren-
cies along with dollar depreciation, its interna-
tional competitiveness did not improve very
much against export competitors in the world
market as shown in Table 9.
V Issues and Prospects for Financial
Development
(1) Structural Adjustments
As we have seen, financial reform in the
Philippines was interrupted by macroeconomic
turmoil. Accordingly, the main issues remain
low productivity and high intermediation costs
due to smalless of scale and lack of competition,
and lack of specific finance fields such as
medium- and long-term industrial finance and
export finance. Thus the basic line of reform
should be to promote competition among finan-
cial institutions by deregulating protectionistic
financial restrictions, and at the same time to
enhance the stability of the financial system by
strengthening means and organizations for
monitoring and supervising financial institutions.
The scale of commercial banks in the Philip-
pines is small, even relative to other Southeast
Asian countries. The largest commercial bank,
PNB, is only 82nd in the asset ranking of Asian
banks, and there are a number of far smaller
banks than PNB [World Bank 1988]. It is not
difficult to find higher management costs and
lower productivity in smaller banks. Accord-
For example, it can be shown that, without
devaluation, the domestic currency value of the
Philippines' external debt should have been only
40% of the actual value in 1985 [Kohsaka
1990]. This generates two additional burdens.
First, this valuation effect gives a sheer capital
loss to the economy. Second, the increased
debt burden tends to expand the fiscal deficit.
This in tum will cause either inflation or crowd-
ing-out or both, depending on the way of deficit
financing, which in any case lead to financial
disintermediation.
18.6 20.4 20.6 21.2
(1980= 1(0)
81.48 69.37 64.80 68.71
99.43 94.67 89.26 89.75
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ingly, consolidation of small banks could be an
urgent objective of the refonn.
Despite the financial crisis, the profitability of
the bank sector as a whole, except for PNB,
improved until 1985. This is mainly because of
increased bank margins as a share of the total
intennediation fee. In particular, if we look at
banks other than foreign and very small banks,
their profit margin amounted to 2.4% of their
total assets, in comparison with 0.7% for other
Asian countries [World Bank 1988]. This high
profit margin must be the result of protecting
high-cost small-scale banks within the banking
system, which would give room for making bad
loans.
This relatively high level of profit margin was
partly due to the tax system and reserve re-
quirements. For example, the gross receipts
tax was estimated to increase the intennedia-
tion fee by up to 1.0% [World Bank 1988],
while the reserve requirement did so by up to
7.9% in 1985 [de Leon 1989].7) The World
Bank [1988] recommended that this require-
ment be reduced and TB holdings be regarded
as reserves. Note here that it is reported that
the intennediation cost net of reserve require-
ment, agrarian credit requirement and gross
receipts tax has shown an explicit downward
trend since 1987 [de Leon 1989].
7) Other examples are the 20% withholding tax
imposed on interest income and agrarian credit
requirements. Reserve requirement ratios are
21% on short-term deposits and 5% on long-
term deposits. According to the World Bank
[1989b], "the combined burden of the gross re-
venue tax and the implicit tax on reserve re-
quirements in 1984 exceeded 150% of value
added in the banking system."
(2) Macroeconomic Adjustments under the
Debt Problem
The financial reform mentioned above refers
to a microeconomic approach to or structural
adjustments of the financial sector. As discus-
sed earlier, the stagnation of the sector in
1983-86 was not necessarily due to shortcom-
ings intrinsic in the sector. In other words, the
prospective financial refonn should remain the
same as was suggested in the early 1980s. The
real problem lies rather in the macroeconomic
context, which is implied by recent develop-
ments since 1987.
A number of experiences in developing coun-
tries have suggested that macroeconomic stabil-
ity is a crucial requirement for financial develop-
ment (see, for instance, Kohsaka [1986] and
McKinnon [1986]). In fact, we can show that,
in the Philippines, the degree of financial inter-
mediation is significantly negatively correlated
to the domestic price level, while positively
correlated to the level of economic activity. 8)
Macroeconomic stability can be thought to pro-
vide "infrastructure" not only by reducing un-
certainties in order for market mechanisms to
function fully, but also by demonstrating the
government's managerial ability in order for the
private sector to rely on it.
In the case of the Philippines, however, the
external debt problem casts a shadow even in
this respect. It is financial disintermediation due
8) Regressing the ratio of total financial assets to
GDP, LtY, on the CPI and the real GDP, y, we
obtained the following result using iterative max-
imum likelihood estimation for the period of
1970-88:
10g(LtY) = -6.33- .189 10g(CPI) +.753 log(y)
(3.64) (2.35) (2.82)
where estimated rho=0.619, S.E. =0.0697,
adjusted R-square=0.810 and t-values are
parenthesized.
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to the larger fiscal deficit which could be the
real obstacle to both revitaIization of the finan-
cial sector and evolvement of financial inter-
mediation. The outstanding amount of TBs
reached 142.6 billion pesos at the end of 1988.
It follows that, since M3 was 184.8 billion
pesos, TBs amounted to as much as 77% of
M3. It is evident that the large issuance of TBs
and other government securities crowded out
both bank deposits and bank loans, thereby
preventing further expansion of financial inter-
mediation.
A significant part of public enterprises' debt
was assumed by the central government in
1986-87. This greatly increased the central
government's debt service burden not only for
amortization (quintuplicated in 1987), but also
for interest paYments (over 40% of total ex-
penditure in 1988). Accordingly, the higher the
domestic interest rate is, the stronger becomes
the pressure for bond issuance on the govern-
ment. Meanwhile, devaluation of the domestic
currency would barely encourage the trade sec-
tor to improve the country's solvency in the
long run, but would increase again the debt
service burden, which would bring into effect
the same argument as in the case of high
interest rates.
The above discussion does not deny the im-
portance of structural adjustments in the finan-
cial sector. But in the case of the Philippines it
is macroeconomic constraints more than any-
thing else which are the first hurdle to be
overcome.
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